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Monday, May 28, 2012

POLITICA DE CHILE: Críticas de ex Presidente Patricio Aylwin a presidente derrocado Salvador Allende generan discrepancias en la oposición






Senadora Isabel Allende emitió una declaración para manifestar su discrepancia respecto de los dichos del ex Mandatario.
En la noche de ayer, luego de darle vueltas durante largas horas, la senadora Isabel Allende emitió una declaración pública. La hija del ex Presidente Salvador Allende quería plantear con fuerza su discrepancia frente a las críticas que virtió Patricio Aylwin a su padre en una entrevista al diario El País.
En la entrevista, el ex mandatario DC enfrentó los cuestionamientos que históricamente sectores de la izquierda han levantado en torno a la DC y su figura, por el fracaso de la Unidad Popular (UP). “Allende hizo un mal gobierno, que cayó por las debilidades de él y su gente”, dijo el ex presidente, quien descartó que su partido haya propiciado el golpe.
“El golpe de Estado fue responsabilidad de quienes lo ejecutaron y de quienes conspiraron para derribar el gobierno constitucional del Presidente Allende. Culparlo a él o a los partidarios de la Unidad Popular contradice toda la evidencia histórica”, señala un párrafo de la declaración de la senadora, quien añadió que Allende siempre estuvo disponible para dialogar con la oposición de entonces -que incluía a la DC-y defendió el legado de su padre.
Las palabras del ex mandatario no fueron fáciles de digerir para otros personeros de la izquierda concertacionista, reabriendo un viejo debate: el rol de la DC en 1973 y el juicio histórico respecto de la UP.
Uno de ellos fue el presidente del PS, Osvaldo Andrade. “Lamento las declaraciones del ex presidente. No es una buena manera de cuidar los entendimientos”. El también socialista Juan Pablo Letelier rechazó otra de las afirmaciones de Aylwin: que el golpe bien pudo haberse producido sin la ayuda de EE.UU., pues, “la mayoría del país rechazaba la política de la UP”.
“Su gobierno fue asediado, hubo conspiración y la DC actuó de forma inadecuada”, afirmó Letelier.
A través de la red social Twitter, otros dirigentes manifestaron su malestar. En la lista estuvo Marco Enríquez-Ominami y Sergio Aguiló. En una entrevista radial, en tanto, el presidente del PC, Guillermo Teillier, acusó a Aylwin de “querer lavarse las manos de la responsabilidad histórica”.
Contrario a las palabras del ex mandatario, el presidente del Senado, Camilo Escalona, dijo estar “orgulloso” de la herencia política de Allende, quien, a su juicio, “mantuvo la cabeza fría hasta el final, pese a la gravedad de la situación que se provocó”. Escalona valoró el rol del ex gobernante DC durante la transición, tal como lo hizo durante un homenaje que se le rindió el viernes pasado. Pero también sostuvo que todos los actores, incluyendo la DC, tuvieron responsabilidad en el golpe.
En una posición diferente, pese a su defensa a Allende, el senador Guido Girardi (PPD) señaló que, “al interior de la UP había contradicciones, pero era difícil enfrentar un gobierno cuando había intereses de diverso tipo no para derrotarlo, sino derrocarlo”.
Desde la DC respaldaron las declaraciones del ex Presidente. El timonel Ignacio Walker coincidió en que los mayores responsables del golpe de Estado fueron “quienes dirigieron el gobierno de la UP, de quienes fuimos opositores”.
Un juicio similar planteó el senador Andrés Zaldívar: sostuvo que su partido tiene un juicio histórico formado respecto del ex mandatario socialista. “El gobierno de la UP provocó muchos problemas, cometió muchos errores, por lo que me parecen acertados los juicios del ex presidente”, dijo.
Otros, como el senador Jorge Pizarro, respaldaron la afirmación del ex presidente respecto de que la DC no participó en el golpe y que el gobierno de Allende “tenía como objetivo dentro de su concepción marxista leninista una sociedad totalitaria y había una diferencia profunda”.



Ricardo Lagos: "El presidente Salvador Allende fue un demócrata. Nada justificaba el golpe"

El ex mandatario se refirió a las declaraciones de Patricio Aylwin sobre el gobierno de la Unidad Popular. Al respecto, dijo que "lo que ha hecho el ex Presidente Aylwin es reiterar lo que fue su rol".

28/05/2012 - 13:04

 
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El ex Presidente Ricardo Lagos se refirió esta mañana a las declaraciones del ex mandatario DC Patricio Aylwin, donde cuestionó al gobierno de la Unidad Popular, de Salvador Allende.
"Creo que el presidente Allende fue un demócrata. Al momento del Golpe de Estado había un parlamento, había tribunales que funcionaban. Por lo tanto, nada justifica el golpe", dijo Lagos Escobar en entrevista con radio Cooperativa.
Lagos dijo que "estoy consciente que hubo llamados por parte de la Cámara de Diputados declarando la inconveniencia de las tareas que estaba realizando Salvador Allende, pero esa declaración no era suficiente para poder encauzar al Presidente porque no tenía los quórum que se requiere". 
"En consecuencia, creo que lo que ha hecho el ex presidente Aylwin es reiterar lo que fue su posición en ese trance tan difícil donde él jugó un rol importante como hombre que participó de esos diálogos finales", agregó el ex mandatario.
DECLARACIONES DE PIÑERA SOBRE ROL DE BACHELET EN EL 27/F
Lagos, además, se refirió a los cuestionamientos del Presidente de la República Sebastián Piñera al manejo del gobierno de Michelle Bachelet tras el terremoto del 27 de febrero de 2010.
Al respecto, dijo que "eso no ayuda en nada, en primer lugar, respecto de cómo recuperar, aunque sea un poquito, el prestigio de la actividad pública porque este tipo de descalificaciones de uno y otro lado, la verdad es que lo único que hacen es alejar a la ciudadanía".
"Hay problemas concretos del día a día, del mediano plazo, de largo del plazo, y esos debieran ser los problemas que debieran estarse abordando, con distintos puntos de vista, por supuesto, no todos podemos pensar lo mismo, pero del diálogo deben surgir los mecanismos para seguir avanzando, y  me parece que esta forma de entender el diálogo político es una desnaturalización completa", aseveró.
Consultado si es deber de Piñera bajar la tensión del clima político, Lagos Escobar dijo que "el Presidente de la República es el principal comunicador del país, es muchas cosas: es jefe de Estado, jefe de gobierno, líder de la coalición, pero el rol esencial es cómo comunica el jefe de Estado a la ciudadanía. Y, en ese rol, creo que es muy importante junto con comunicar, buscar la forma".
"Me parece a mí que la crispación no es el mejor momento y ayuda cuando el jefe de Estado hace un llamado a cuidar el lenguaje, las formas. Se puede tener un diálogo franco, pero ese diálogo no autoriza a llevar ese tipo de descalificaciones", expresó.
De todos modos, Lagos concluyó que "es muy difícil entre Presidentes y ex Presidentes hacerse juicios los unos a los otros".

El ex presidente se confiesa

Patricio Aylwin fue enemigo de la izquierda a comienzos de los 70, opositor clave de Pinochet y líder de la transición más compleja y exitosa de Latinoamérica. Ahora, a los 93 años, en una entrevista exclusiva para EL PAÍS rememora a Pinochet y Allende


Junto al socialista Salvador Allende y al dictador Augusto Pinochet, Patricio Aylwin Azócar es probablemente uno de los tres personajes más trascendentes del pasado reciente chileno. Pero, a diferencia del médico y del militar, célebres para bien y para mal en el mundo entero, este abogado de la Democracia Cristiana (DC) es un político paradójico que resulta difícil de encasillar en un mundo de blanco y negro. Entre 1970 y 1973 fue enemigo de la izquierda: era uno de los líderes de la oposición al Gobierno de la Unidad Popular de Allende. El papel que desempeñó su partido en el golpe de Pinochet es, de hecho, una discusión que renace cada cierto tiempo en Chile. Durante la dictadura, entre 1973 y 1989, fue enemigo de la derecha: convertido en uno de los líderes clave de la oposición a Pinochet, fue uno de los artífices de la peculiar alianza entre el centro y la izquierda que permitió derrotar al dictador tras un plebiscito. Fue la génesis de la Concertación.
En 1990, cuando Chile era una nación de enemigos, la mayoría de los chilenos le encomendó a Aylwin la tarea de ser el primer presidente democrático después de 17 años. Y desde La Moneda, con Pinochet todavía al mando del Ejército, lideró la transición más compleja y exitosa de Latinoamérica, cuyo principal mérito fue “restablecer una sociedad abierta y superar la pelea excluyente de unos y otros”. “Porque es evidente que los chilenos se reconciliaron”, afirma. Sin esa administración fundacional, Chile sería distinto del país que es hoy.

No es posible una transición exitosa sin la reconstitución de la verdad”
Es otoño en Santiago. El atardecer se deja sentir en el comedor de la casa de Aylwin en Providencia, un barrio tradicional donde las construcciones de mitad del siglo pasado poco a poco son reemplazadas por edificios. Junto aquí desde 1956 con su esposa, Leonor Oyarzún, con quien comparte 5 hijos, 17 nietos y 5 bisnietos.
Tenía 54 años cuando Allende se quitó la vida en La Moneda; 71 cuando él mismo llegó a presidente y 88 cuando Pinochet murió en una clínica de Santiago en 2006. Aylwin nació en 1918. En noviembre pasado cumplió 93 años.
Pregunta. ¿Hubiese sido posible esa transición exitosa sin la verdad sobre los muertos y desaparecidos?
Respuesta. No es posible una transición exitosa sin la reconstitución de la verdad. Y por eso, un mes después del inicio de mi Gobierno, anuncié la formación de la Comisión Rettig para investigar las violaciones a los derechos humanos.
Lo hizo pese a los consejos de sus asesores, que le recomendaban prudencia. Tras nueve meses de trabajo, el equipo concluyó que 2.296 personas habían muerto durante el régimen militar. Luego Aylwin pidió perdón en nombre del Estado de Chile, con la voz quebrada, en un discurso por televisión que es parte de la memoria colectiva del país. Eso no le gustó a Pinochet, que desconoció la verdad jurídica e histórica del informe.
P. Usted también fue cauto y siempre habló de “buscar la justicia en la medida de lo posible”.
R. Usé esa frase, y la puse en práctica, con el fin de crearle conciencia a la gente de que no era cuestión de que nosotros llegásemos y que al día siguiente hubiese democracia para todos, sino que era un proceso. Y que este proceso seguía con el exdictador de comandante en jefe del Ejército.
A comienzos de los años noventa, la justicia comenzó a abrir las primeras causas contra militares y agentes de la dictadura. Sin embargo, dice: “No habría sido viable juzgar a Pinochet. Habría dividido terriblemente al país e, incluso, puesto en peligro la continuidad del Gobierno”. ¿Pero era posible que lo llevara al banquillo la justicia internacional, como pretendió el juez Baltasar Garzón años después? “Los problemas de Estado se deben juzgar dentro del país”, afirma.
P. Los estudiantes chilenos que salieron a las calles en 2011, nacidos fundamentalmente después del retorno a la democracia, son críticos con la transición porque aseguran que se hicieron muchas concesiones.
R. No cuesta nada decirlo después de que las cosas están hechas. Las críticas a la transición son bonitas frases, pero prueban la ignorancia de lo que realmente ocurrió y del proceso que vivió Chile.

Pinochet no fue un hombre que obstaculizara las políticas del Gobierno que yo encabecé”
Aylwin sale a caminar por su barrio y, al ritmo de su paso todavía ágil, recita en silencio los poemas de Calderón de la Barca, Rubén Darío y Amado Nervo. Los aprendió hace décadas, cuando era un niño. Hoy los utiliza para ejercitar la memoria. “Soy un viejo conservado, pero no conservador. Todavía me siento bien…”.
Hoy por hoy está retirado del mundo público y hace años que no concede entrevistas. Pero es una de aquellas figuras que, incluso desde el silencio, como el expresidente español Adolfo Suárez, pareciera trascender el bien y el mal. Es la razón por la que se le invoca en tiempos de crisis. Y en Chile, aunque las cifras económicas ahora están perfectamente, la política y las instituciones democráticas sufren graves problemas: de acuerdo con encuestas recientes, los chilenos no tienen confianza en los partidos, ni en el Congreso, ni en los tribunales ni en el Gobierno ni en la oposición. Y eso explica, en parte, el estallido social de 2011.
En medio del clima de crispación, el actual presidente chileno, Sebastián Piñera, convocó a Aylwin a La Moneda en diciembre. “Fui amigo de sus padres, por lo que tengo una simpatía. Sin embargo, observo que no hay solidez en este Gobierno”, asegura el exmandatario sobre la Administración de derechas. “La UDI está por un lado, la RN, por otro. Hay demasiadas diferencias entre los partidos oficialistas. ¿Cuál es el proyecto? Me preocupa hacia dónde va el país bajo el liderazgo de Piñera. Es decir, cuáles son las grandes líneas afirmadas por el presidente, planteadas en el Congreso y traducidas en proyectos institucionales para poner en práctica una nueva visión del país”. ¿Le falta relato, como dicen los analistas? “Yo no sé qué será. Pero…¿cuál es el proyecto que representa Piñera? El piñerismo”.
P. La Concertación, la alianza de centro-izquierda que usted ayudó a fundar, tiene un bajo apoyo ciudadano. ¿Tiene futuro ese pacto?
R. No he pensado sobre esa materia. Sin embargo, un proyecto de sociedad que busque democracia, justicia social, crecimiento económico, y que levante al país, debiera tener como eje a la DC y al socialismo.
El expresidente se define como “un animal político” y señala que su oficio “es una actividad difícil, pero indispensable”. La sigue cotidianamente: se despierta a las siete y su primera actividad diaria es recoger los periódicos para leerlos mientras desayuna. Después realiza ejercicios en una salita (dos veces a la semana lo acompaña un quinesiólogo), cruza el patio trasero, se instala en su oficina de una casa contigua y contesta correspondencia con lápiz y papel. Le gusta la lectura y en el verano no se despegó de Pinochet. La biografía, obra del historiador Gonzalo Vial.
P. Usted que lo conoció bien, ¿cómo era él?
R. Pinochet tenía varias caras.
El dictador se quedó al mando de los militares durante todo el primer Gobierno democrático (1990-1994). Y la relación entre el presidente y su subordinado — “usted es mi jefe, yo le obedezco a usted”, le dijo Pinochet una vez— era formalmente respetuosa. “Sabía hacerse el simpático cuando quería. Era socarrón y diablito, jugaba para su propio lado. Pero Pinochet no fue un hombre que obstaculizara las políticas del Gobierno que yo encabecé”, dice el veterano líder democristiano.
Sin embargo, ese periodo estuvo marcado por la constante tensión y, como en el 23-F español, la incipiente democracia se vio amenazada al menos en dos ocasiones.Al comienzo de la dictadura, indica Aylwin, “Pinochet representaba, por una parte, orden, seguridad, respeto, autoridad. Y, por otra, una economía de mercado que iba a permitir la prosperidad del país. Esos fueron los dos factores definitorios, y por eso Pinochet fue popular. Era un dictador, pero popular”. En el plebiscito de 1988, de hecho, obtuvo el 44,01% de los votos.
P. ¿Le sorprendió cuando en 2004 reventó el caso Riggs y se descubrieron las cuentas millonarias de Pinochet?

Allende demostró que no fue buen político. Si lo hubiera sido, no habría pasado lo que le pasó”
R. La verdad es que a mí me sorprendió. Primero, porque nunca tuve antecedentes. Segundo, porque, en la historia de Chile, ningún presidente había salido más rico al finalizar su Gobierno. Y esto, desde el libertador Bernardo O'Higgins hacia delante. El general Carlos Ibáñez fue dictador, pero no se enriqueció.
¿Y Allende? ¿cómo era Salvador Allende?La Democracia Cristiana (DC), históricamente ha sido de centro y, fundamentalmente, antiderechista. Sin embargo, entre 1970 y 1973, durante el Gobierno socialista de la Unidad Popular, la colectividad realizó una alianza táctica con la derecha y se opuso a Allende. En esos años, Aylwin desempeñó un papel importante: “Fuimos adversarios, pero adversarios bastante civilizados. Como presidente del Senado y luego del partido, me tocó negociar directamente con Salvador Allende. Tuvimos conversaciones difíciles”.
P. El expresidente Eduardo Frei Montalva, ya fallecido, señaló en una oportunidad que lo consideraba frívolo. ¿Comparte ese juicio?
P. No le podría decir que Allende no era frívolo. Era muy simpático, atractivo. Tenía una autoestima muy fuerte. Sabía convencer, era un muy buen argumentador. Y lo hacía con el alma, le salía de dentro.
P. ¿Usted cree que era un buen político?
R. Allende terminó demostrando que no fue buen político, porque si hubiera sido buen político no habría pasado lo que le pasó.
Ya han pasado casi 40 años del golpe de Estado de 1973. El debate sobre las causas del quiebre institucional, sin embargo, todavía son debatidas por políticos e historiadores. Aylwin ha señalado que el talón de Aquiles de Allende fue haberse convertido en rehén de los partidos de izquierda. Hoy en día, al analizar el proceso, insiste en que “hizo un mal gobierno y que el Gobierno cayó por debilidades de él y de su gente”.
Hay quienes tienen otras explicaciones: el Congreso estadounidense desclasificó en 1975 el informe Church, que indica que, en el contexto de la guerra fría, los norteamericanos invirtieron mucho dinero entre 1963 y 1973 para evitar que Chile siguiera los pasos de Cuba. Y lograron la desestabilización del Gobierno de Allende. Sin embargo, Aylwin asegura: “El golpe se habría producido sin la ayuda de Estados Unidos. Estados Unidos lo empujó, pero la mayoría del país rechazaba la política de la Unidad Popular, eso era evidente”.
P. Carlos Altamirano, secretario general del PS en aquella época, publicó sus memorias recientemente, y en el libro señala que su partido, la DC, tiene una “responsabilidad histórica” en el golpe de Estado de 1973.
R. Carlos Altamirano puede decir muchas cosas, pero, en el golpe de Estado, la DC no tuvo ninguna participación. Eso puedo asegurarlo de manera absoluta, en conciencia. Y yo fui durante todo el Gobierno de Allende parte de la dirección del partido. Estuvimos interesados en cambiar la orientación del Gobierno de Allende, pero no en derrocarlo. El golpe militar fue otra cosa.

Habría habido golpe sin ayuda de Estados Unidos. El país rechazaba la Unidad Popular”
P. “Nunca Frei (Montalva) o Aylwin intentaron tirarle un salvavidas a Salvador”, ha dicho Altamirano.
R. Creo que es una afirmación infundada. Yo diría que las actitudes demagógicas de Carlos Altamirano hicieron más daño a Salvador Allende que las posiciones que pueda haber tomado la DC. Él se esforzó por radicalizar el conflicto, y en eso, indudablemente, la víctima fue el Gobierno.
Aylwin explica: “Allende no era el responsable de todo lo que su Gobierno hacía. Sectores de PS, empezando por Altamirano, enturbiaban la convivencia nacional, la relación entre La Moneda y la oposición, y no ayudaban en nada al presidente. Practicaron la política de choque y de hechos consumados, no cabe duda. El lema era Avanzar sin transar. Nunca nos miraron como eventuales aliados. Para que triunfara el socialismo en Chile había que eliminar a la DC”. El expresidente indica que, al reabrir la discusión, “ellos buscan alguna explicación del fracaso del Gobierno de Allende y del socialismo en Chile”. Y concluye: “No tiene ninguna razón lógica echarnos la culpa”.
El 4 de septiembre de 1990, Aylwin encabezó los funerales de Estado del expresidente Allende, cuyos restos, hasta ese momento, estaban en un cementerio de la ciudad de Viña del Mar. “Debo decirlo con franqueza: si se repitieran las mismas circunstancias, volvería a ser decidido opositor, pero los horrores y quebrantos del drama vivido por Chile desde entonces nos han enseñado que esas circunstancias no deben ni pueden repetirse por motivo alguno”, dijo Aylwin.
El quiebre de la democracia es un capítulo difícil para el exmandatario. En 1974, de hecho, comenzó a escribir un libro sobre la relación de la DC y el Gobierno de la Unidad Popular. Aunque ya lo finalizó, lo sigue revisando una y otra vez. “He tenido dudas de la conveniencia de que yo haga público ese libro”, confiesa.
P. ¿Podría reabrir viejas heridas?
R. Estoy indeciso sobre si debo dejar que las próximas generaciones discutan estos temas y no ser yo el que abra el debate.
Aylwin decidió no escribir memorias: "Siempre he sido contrario a los personalismos". Sin embargo, aunque no piensa demasiado en el futuro, sabe perfectamente cómo le gustaría que se le recuerde: “Espero que mis compatriotas y la historia me muestren como un demócrata, un chileno abierto al pluralismo, impulsor de la justicia social y defensor de los derechos humanos”.

Salvador Allende

This name uses Spanish naming customs; the first or paternal family name is Allende and the second or maternal family name is Gossens.
Salvador Allende
29th President of Chile
In office
4 November 1970 – 11 September 1973
Preceded byEduardo Frei Montalva
Succeeded byAugusto Pinochet
56th President of the Senate of the Republic of Chile
In office
December 27, 1966 – 1969
Preceded byTomás Reyes Vicuña
Succeeded byTomás Pablo Elorza
Minister of Health and Social Welfare
In office
August 28, 1938 – April 2, 1942
Preceded byMiguel Etchebarne Riol
Succeeded byEduardo Escudero Forrastal
Personal details
Born(1908-06-26)26 June 1908
Valparaíso, Chile
Died11 September 1973(1973-09-11) (aged 65)
Santiago, Chile
NationalityChilean
Political partySocialist Party of Chile
Popular Unity coalition
Spouse(s)Hortensia Bussi (1940–1973)
ChildrenBeatriz Allende (1943–1977)
Carmen Paz Allende (b.1944)
Isabel Allende (b.1945)
Alma materUniversity of Chile
ProfessionMedical doctor
Civil servant
ReligionAgnostic- Roman Catholic
Signature
Website[2]
Wikisource has original works written by or about:
Salvador Allende
Wikiquote has a collection of quotations related to: Salvador Allende
Wikimedia Commons has media related to: Salvador Allende
Salvador Allende Gossens (Spanish pronunciation: [salβaˈðoɾ aˈʝende ˈɣosens]; 26 June 1908 – 11 September 1973) was a Chilean physician and politician who is generally considered the first democratically elected Marxist to become president of a country in Latin America.[1]
Allende's involvement in Chilean political life spanned a period of nearly forty years. As a member of the Socialist Party, he was a senator, deputy and cabinet minister. He unsuccessfully ran for the presidency in the 1952, 1958, and 1964 elections. In 1970, he won the presidency in a close three-way race, formally elected by Congress as no candidate had gained a majority.
Allende adopted the policy of nationalization of industries and collectivization. On 11 September 1973 the military, citing a call by the Chilean Congress to end his presidency, staged a coup against Allende.[2][3] As the armed forces surrounded La Moneda Palace, Allende gave his last speech vowing not to resign,[4] and committed suicide thereafter.[5] After Allende's ouster, Chile was led by a military junta, and then as a dictatorship by General Augusto Pinochet.

Contents

Early life

Allende was born on 26 June 1908[6] in Valparaíso.[7] He was the son of Salvador Allende Castro and Laura Gossens Uribe. Allende's family belonged to the Chilean upper class and had a long tradition of political involvement in progressive and liberal causes. His grandfather was a prominent physician and a social reformist who founded one of the first secular schools in Chile.[8] Salvador Allende was of Belgian and Basque[9] descent.
Allende attended high school at the Liceo Eduardo de la Barra in Valparaíso. As a teenager, his main intellectual and political influence came from the shoe-maker Juan De Marchi, an Italian-born anarchist.[8] Allende was a talented athlete in his youth, being a member of the Everton de Viña del Mar sports club (named after the more famous English football club of the same name and which regularly competes at the highest level in Chilean football), where he is said to have excelled at the long jump.[10] Allende then graduated with a medical degree in 1926 from the University of Chile.[8]
He co-founded a section of the Socialist Party of Chile (founded in 1933 with Marmaduque Grove and others) in Valparaíso[8] and became its chairman. He married Hortensia Bussi with whom he had three daughters. In 1933, he published his doctoral thesis Higiene Mental y Delincuencia (Crime and Mental Hygiene) in which he criticized Cesare Lombroso's proposals.[11]
In 1938, Allende was in charge of the electoral campaign of the Popular Front headed by Pedro Aguirre Cerda.[8] The Popular Front's slogan was "Bread, a Roof and Work!"[8] After its electoral victory, he became Minister of Health in the Reformist Popular Front government which was dominated by the Radicals.[8] While serving in this position, Allende was responsible for the passage of a wide range of progressive social reforms, including safety laws protecting workers in the factories, higher pensions for widows, maternity care, and free lunch programmes for schoolchildren.[12]
Upon entering the government, Allende relinquished his parliamentary seat for Valparaíso, which he had won in 1937. Around that time, he wrote La Realidad Médico Social de Chile (The social and medical reality of Chile). After the Kristallnacht in Nazi Germany, Allende and other members of the Parliament sent a telegram to Adolf Hitler denouncing the persecution of Jews.[13] Following Aguirre's death in 1941, he was again elected deputy while the Popular Front was renamed Democratic Alliance.
In 1945, Allende became senator for the Valdivia, Llanquihue, Chiloé, Aisén and Magallanes provinces; then for Tarapacá and Antofagasta in 1953; for Aconcagua and Valparaíso in 1961; and once more for Chiloé, Aisén and Magallanes in 1969. He became president of the Chilean Senate in 1966.
Salvador Allende in 1964.
His three unsuccessful bids for the presidency (in the 1952, 1958 and 1964 elections) prompted Allende to joke that his epitaph would be "Here lies the next President of Chile." In 1952, as candidate for the Frente de Acción Popular (Popular Action Front, FRAP), he obtained only 5.4% of the votes, partly due to a division within socialist ranks over support for Carlos Ibáñez. In 1958, again as the FRAP candidate, Allende obtained 28.5% of the vote. This time, his defeat was attributed to votes lost to the populist Antonio Zamorano.[citation needed] In 1964, once more as the FRAP candidate, he lost again, polling 38.6% of the votes against 55.6% for Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei. As it became clear that the election would be a race between Allende and Frei, the political right – which initially had backed Radical Julio Durán.[citation needed] – settled for Frei as "the lesser evil". Allende's socialist beliefs and friendship with Cuban president Fidel Castro made him deeply unpopular within the administrations of successive U.S. presidents, from John F. Kennedy to Richard Nixon. Chile was the first Government in continental America to recognize the People's Republic of China in 1971.[citation needed]

Election

Chilean workers marching in support of Allende in 1964.
Main article: Chilean presidential election, 1970
Allende won the 1970 Chilean presidential election as leader of the Unidad Popular ("Popular Unity") coalition. On 4 September 1970, he obtained a narrow plurality of 36.2 percent to 34.9 percent over Jorge Alessandri, a former president, with 27.8 percent going to a third candidate (Radomiro Tomic) of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), whose electoral platform was similar to Allende's. According to the Chilean Constitution of the time, if no presidential candidate obtained a majority of the popular vote, Congress would choose one of the two candidates with the highest number of votes as the winner. Tradition was for Congress to vote for the candidate with the highest popular vote, regardless of margin. Indeed, former president Jorge Alessandri had been elected in 1958 with only 31.6 percent of the popular vote, defeating Allende.
One month after the election, on 20 October, while the senate had still to reach a decision and negotiations were actively in place between the Christian Democrats and the Popular Unity, General René Schneider, Commander in Chief of the Chilean Army, was shot resisting a kidnap attempt by a group led by General Roberto Viaux. Hospitalized, he died of his wounds three days later, on 23 October. Viaux's kidnapping plan had been supported by the CIA, although the then U.S. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger claims to have ordered the plans postponed at the last moment. Many believe Kissinger's statement to be false and evidence points towards CIA director Richard Helms following orders directly from President Nixon to do whatever was necessary in order “to get rid of him”, referring to Allende. Nixon handed over a blank check to Helms, which allowed him to use full discretion in ridding Chile of Allende’s presence and “making the economy scream”. Schneider was a defender of the "constitutionalist" doctrine that the army's role is exclusively professional, its mission being to protect the country's sovereignty and not to interfere in politics.
General Schneider's death was widely disapproved of and, for the time, ended military opposition to Allende,[14] whom the parliament finally chose on 24 October. On 26 October, President Eduardo Frei named General Carlos Prats as commander in chief of the army to replace René Schneider.
Allende assumed the presidency on 3 November 1970 after signing a Statute of Constitutional Guarantees proposed by the Christian Democrats in return for their support in Congress. In an extensive interview with Régis Debray in 1972, Allende explained his reasons for agreeing to the guarantees.[15] Some critics have interpreted Allende's responses as an admission that signing the Statute was only a tactical move.[16]

Presidency

Main article: Chile under Allende
Allende with Argentine President Héctor José Cámpora
Upon assuming power, Allende began to carry out his platform of implementing a socialist programme called La vía chilena al socialismo ("the Chilean Path to Socialism"). This included nationalization of large-scale industries (notably copper mining and banking), and government administration of the health care system, educational system (with the help of an U.S. educator, Jane A. Hobson-Gonzalez from Kokomo, Indiana), a programme of free milk for children in the schools and shanty towns of Chile, and an expansion of the land seizure and redistribution already begun under his predecessor Eduardo Frei Montalva,[17] who had nationalized between one-fifth and one-quarter of all the properties listed for takeover.[18] The Allende government's intention was to seize all holdings of more than eighty irrigated hectares.[19] Allende also intended to improve the socio-economic welfare of Chile's poorest citizens;[citation needed] a key element was to provide employment, either in the new nationalised enterprises or on public work projects.[citation needed]
Allende’s first step in early 1971 was to raise minimum wages (in real terms) for blue-collar workers by 37%-41% and 8%-10% for white-collar workers. Educational, food, and housing assistance was significantly expanded, with public-housing starts going up twelvefold and eligibility for free milk extended from age 6 to age 15. A year later, blue-collar wages were raised by 27% in real terms and white-collar wages became fully indexed.[20] Price controls were also set up, while the Allende Government introduced a system of distribution networks through various agencies (including local committees on supply and prices) to ensure that the new rules were adhered to by shopkeepers.[21]
The new Minister of Agriculture, Jacques Chonchol, promised to expropriate all estates which were larger than eighty “basic” hectares. This promise was kept, with no farm in Chile exceeding this limit by the end of 1972.[22]
The Allende Government also sought to bring the arts (both serious and popular) to the mass of the Chilean population by funding a number of cultural endeavours. With eighteen-year olds and illiterates now granted the right to vote, mass participation in decision-making was encouraged by the Allende government, with traditional hierarchical structures now challenged by socialist egalitarianism. The Allende Government was also able to draw upon the idealism of its supporters, with teams of "Allendistas" travelling into the countryside and shanty towns to perform volunteer work.[22]
Social spending was dramatically increased, particularly for housing, education, and health, while a major effort was made to redistribute wealth to poorer Chileans. As a result of new initiatives in nutrition and health, together with higher wages, many poorer Chileans were able to feed themselves and clothe themselves better than they had been able to before. Public access to the social security system was increased, while state benefits such as family allowances were raised significantly.[22]
Chilean presidents were allowed a maximum term of six years, which may explain Allende's haste to restructure the economy. Not only was a major restructuring program organized (the Vuskovic plan), he had to make it a success if a Socialist successor to Allende was going to be elected. In the first year of Allende's term, the short-term economic results of Minister of the Economy Pedro Vuskovic's expansive monetary policy were highly favorable: 12% industrial growth and an 8.6% increase in GDP, accompanied by major declines in inflation (down from 34.9% to 22.1%) and unemployment (down to 3.8%). However by 1972, the Chilean escudo had an inflation rate of 140%. The average Real GDP contracted between 1971 and 1973 at an annual rate of 5.6% ("negative growth"); and the government's fiscal deficit soared while foreign reserves declined [Flores, 1997: source requires title/publisher]. The combination of inflation and government-mandated price-fixing, together with the "disappearance" of basic commodities from supermarket shelves, led to the rise of black markets in rice, beans, sugar, and flour.[23] The Chilean economy also suffered as a result of a US campaign against the Allende government.[24] The Allende government announced it would default on debts owed to international creditors and foreign governments. Allende also froze all prices while raising salaries. His implementation of these policies was strongly opposed by landowners, employers, businessmen and transporters associations, and some civil servants and professional unions. The rightist opposition was led by National Party, the Roman Catholic Church (which in 1973 was displeased with the direction of educational policy),[25] and eventually the Christian Democrats. There were growing tensions with foreign multinational corporations and the government of the United States.
Allende also undertook Project Cybersyn, a system of networked telex machines and computers. Cybersyn was developed by British cybernetics expert Stafford Beer. The network transmitted data from factories to the government in Santiago, allowing for economic planning in real-time.[26]
In 1971, Chile re-established diplomatic relations with Cuba, joining Mexico and Canada in rejecting a previously-established Organization of American States convention prohibiting governments in the Western Hemisphere from establishing diplomatic relations with Cuba. Shortly afterward, Cuban president Fidel Castro made a month-long visit to Chile. Originally the visit was supposed to be one week, however Castro enjoyed Chile, and one week turned to another. The visit, in which Castro held massive rallies and gave public advice to Allende, was seen by those on the political right as proof to support their view that "The Chilean Path to Socialism" was an effort to put Chile on the same path as Cuba.[citation needed]
October 1972 saw the first of what were to be a wave of strikes. The strikes were led first by truckers, and later by small businessmen, some (mostly professional) unions and some student groups. Other than the inevitable damage to the economy, the chief effect of the 24-day strike was to induce Allende to bring the head of the army, general Carlos Prats, into the government as Interior Minister.[23] Allende also instructed the government to begin requisitioning trucks in order to keep the nation from coming to a halt. Government supporters also helped to mobilize trucks and buses but violence served as a deterrent to full mobilization, even with police protection for the strike breakers. Allende's actions were eventually declared unlawful by the Chilean appeals court and the government was ordered to return trucks to their owners.[27]
Throughout this presidency racial tensions between the poor descendants of indigenous people, who supported Allende's reforms, and the white settler elite increased.[28]
Allende raised wages on a number of occasions throughout 1970 and 1971, but these wage hikes were negated by the in-tandem inflation of Chile's fiat currency. Although price rises had also been high under Frei (27% a year between 1967 and 1970), a basic basket of consumer goods rose by 120% from 190 to 421 escudos in one month alone, August 1972. In the period 1970–72, while Allende was in government, exports fell 24% and imports rose 26%, with imports of food rising an estimated 149%.[29]
Export income fell due to a hard hit copper industry: the price of copper on international markets fell by almost a third, and post-nationalization copper production fell as well. Copper is Chile's single most important export (more than half of Chile's export receipts were from this sole commodity[30]). The price of copper fell from a peak of $66 per ton in 1970 to only $48–9 in 1971 and 1972.[31] Chile was already dependent on food imports, and this decline in export earnings coincided with declines in domestic food production following Allende's agrarian reforms.[32]
Throughout his presidency, Allende remained at odds with the Chilean Congress, which was dominated by the Christian Democratic Party. The Christian Democrats (who had campaigned on a socialist platform in the 1970 elections, but drifted away from those positions during Allende's presidency, eventually forming a coalition with the National Party), continued to accuse Allende of leading Chile toward a Cuban-style dictatorship, and sought to overturn many of his more radical policies. Allende and his opponents in Congress repeatedly accused each other of undermining the Chilean Constitution and acting undemocratically.
Allende's increasingly bold socialist policies (partly in response to pressure from some of the more radical members within his coalition), combined with his close contacts with Cuba, heightened fears in Washington. The Nixon administration began exerting economic pressure on Chile via multilateral organizations, and continued to back Allende's opponents in the Chilean Congress. Almost immediately after his election, Nixon directed CIA and U.S. State Department officials to "put pressure" on the Allende government.[33]

Foreign relations during Allende's presidency

Allende's Popular Unity government tried to maintain normal relations with the United States. When Chile nationalized its copper industry, Washington cut off U.S. credits and increased its support to opposition. Forced to seek alternative sources of trade and finance, Chile gained commitments from the Soviet Union to invest some $400 million in Chile in the next six years. Allende's government was disappointed that it received far less economic assistance from the USSR than it hoped for. Trade between the two countries did not significantly increase and the credits were mainly linked to the purchase of Soviet equipment. Moreover, credits from the Soviet Union were much less than those provided to the People's Republic of China and countries of Eastern Europe. When Allende visited the USSR in late 1972 in search of more aid and additional lines of credit, after 3 years of political and economic failure and chaos, he was turned down.[34]

Foreign involvement in Chile during Allende's Presidency

US involvement

Main article: United States intervention in Chile
The possibility of Allende winning Chile's 1970 election was deemed a disaster by a US administration which wanted to protect US business interests and prevent any spread of Communism during the Cold War.[35] In September 1970, President Nixon informed the CIA that an Allende government in Chile would not be acceptable and authorized $10 million to stop Allende from coming to power or unseat him.[36] Henry Kissinger's 40 Committee and the CIA planned to impede Allende's investiture as President of Chile with covert efforts known as "Track I" and "Track II"; Track I sought to prevent Allende from assuming power via so-called "parliamentary trickery", while under the Track II initiative, the CIA tried to convince key Chilean military officers to carry out a coup.[36]
During Nixon's presidency, U.S. officials attempted to prevent Allende's election by financing political parties aligned with opposition candidate Jorge Alessandri and supporting strikes in the mining and transportation sectors.[37]
After the 1970 election, the Track I operation attempted to incite Chile's outgoing president, Eduardo Frei Montalva, to persuade his party (PDC) to vote in Congress for Alessandri.[citation needed] Under the plan, Alessandri would resign his office immediately after assuming it and call new elections. Eduardo Frei would then be constitutionally able to run again (since the Chilean Constitution did not allow a president to hold two consecutive terms, but allowed multiple non-consecutive ones), and presumably easily defeat Allende. The Chilean Congress instead chose Allende as President, on the condition that he would sign a "Statute of Constitutional Guarantees" affirming that he would respect and obey the Chilean Constitution, and that his reforms would not undermine any of its elements.
Track II was aborted, as parallel initiatives already underway within the Chilean military rendered it moot.[38]
During the second term of office of Democratic President Bill Clinton, the CIA acknowledged having played a role in Chilean politics prior to the coup, but its degree of involvement is debated. The CIA was notified by its Chilean contacts of the impending coup two days in advance, but contends it "played no direct role in" the coup.[39]
Much of the internal opposition to Allende's policies came from business sector, and recently-released U.S. government documents confirm that the U.S. indirectly[24] funded the truck drivers' strike,[40] which exacerbated the already chaotic economic situation prior to the coup.
The most prominent U.S. corporations in Chile prior to Allende's presidency were the Anaconda and Kennecott copper companies, and ITT Corporation, International Telephone and Telegraph. Both the copper corporations aimed to expand privatized copper production in the city of El Teniente in the Chilean Andes, the world's largest underground copper mine.[41] At the end of 1968, according to US Department of Commerce data, U.S. corporate holdings in Chile amounted to $964 million. Anaconda and Kennecott accounted for 28% of U.S. holdings, but ITT had by far the largest holding of any single corporation, with an investment of $200 million in Chile.[41] In 1970, before Allende was elected, ITT owned 70% of Chitelco, the Chilean Telephone Company and funded El Mercurio, a Chilean right-wing newspaper. Documents released in 2000 by the CIA confirmed that before the elections of 1970, ITT gave $700,000 to Allende's conservative opponent, Jorge Alessandri, with help from the CIA on how to channel the money safely. ITT president Harold Geneen also offered $1 million to the CIA to help defeat Allende in the elections.[42]
After General Pinochet assumed power, United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger told President Richard Nixon that the U.S. "didn't do it," but "we helped them...created the conditions as great as possible." (referring to the coup itself).[43] Recent documents declassified under the Clinton administration's Chile Declassification Project show that the United States government and the CIA sought the overthrow of Allende in 1970 immediately before he took office ("Project FUBELT"). Many documents regarding the 1973 coup remain classified.

Soviet involvement

Material based on reports from the Mitrokhin Archive, the KGB said of Allende that "he was made to understand the necessity of reorganising Chile's army and intelligence services, and of setting up a relationship between Chile's and the USSR's intelligence services". It is also claimed that Allende was given $30,000 "in order to solidify the trusted relations" with him.[44] According to Vasili Mitrokhin, a former KGB major and senior archivist in the KGB intelligence central KGB office in the Yasenevo area of Moscow, Allende made a personal request for Soviet money through his personal contact, KGB officer Svyatoslav Kuznetsov (codenamed LEONID), who urgently came to Chile from Mexico City to help Allende.[45] The original allocation of money for these elections through the KGB was $400,000, a personal subsidy of $50,000 was sent directly to Allende, with an additional $100,000 funneled through funds provided to the Chilean Communist Party.[45]
Historian Christopher Andrew, argued that help from the KGB was a decisive factor, because Allende won by a narrow margin of 39,000 votes of a total of the 3 million cast. After the elections, the KGB director Yuri Andropov obtained permission for additional money and other resources from the Central Committee of the CPSU to ensure an Allende victory in Congress. In his request on 24 October, he stated that the KGB "will carry out measures designed to promote the consolidation of Allende's victory and his election to the post of President of the country". In his KGB file, Allende was reported to have "stated his willingness to co-operate on a confidential basis and provide any necessary assistance, since he considered himself a friend of the Soviet Union". He willingly shared political information.[45]
Andrew writes that regular Soviet contact with Allende after his election was maintained by his KGB case officer, Svyatoslav Kuznetsov, who was instructed by KGB's the 'Centre' to "exert a favorable influence on Chilean government policy". Allende was said to have reacted "positively."
Political and moral support came mostly through the Communist Party and unions. For instance, he received the Lenin Peace Prize from the Soviet Union in 1972. However, there were some fundamental differences between Allende and Soviet political analysts who believed that some violence – or measures that those analysts "theoretically considered to be just" – should have been used.[46] According to Andrew's account of the Mitrokhin archives, "In the KGB's view, Allende's fundamental error was his unwillingness to use force against his opponents. Without establishing complete control over all the machinery of the State, his hold on power could not be secure."[44]
Declarations from KGB General Nikolai Leonov, former Deputy Chief of the First Chief Directorate of the KGB, confirmed that the Soviet Union supported Allende's government economically, politically and militarily.[46] Leonov stated in an interview at the Chilean Center of Public Studies (CEP) that the Soviet economic support included over $100 million in credit, three fishing ships (that distributed 17,000 tons of frozen fish to the population), factories (as help after the 1971 earthquake), 3,100 tractors, 74,000 tons of wheat and more than a million tins of condensed milk.[46]
In mid-1973 the USSR had approved the delivery of weapons (artillery, tanks) to the Chilean Army. However, when news of an attempt from the Army to depose Allende through a coup d'état reached Soviet officials, the shipment was redirected to another country.[46]

Crisis

See also: Tanquetazo and Chile under Allende
On June 29, 1973, Colonel Roberto Souper surrounded the presidential palace, La Moneda, with his tank regiment but failed to depose the government.[47] That failed coup d’état – known as the Tanquetazo ("tank putsch") – organised by the nationalist Patria y Libertad paramilitary group, was followed by a general strike at the end of July that included the copper miners of El Teniente.
In August, 1973, a constitutional crisis occurred, and the Supreme Court of Chile publicly complained about the inability of Allende government to enforce the law of the land. On August 22, the Chamber of Deputies (with the Christian Democrats uniting with the National Party) accused the government of unconstitutional acts through Allende's refusal to promulgate constitutional amendments, already approved by the Chamber, which would have prevented his government from continuing his massive nationalization plan[48] and called upon the military to enforce constitutional order.[49]
For months, Allende had feared calling upon the Carabineros ("Carabineers", the national police force), suspecting them of disloyalty to his government. On August 9, President Allende appointed General Carlos Prats as Minister of Defence. On August 24, 1973, General Prats was forced to resign both as defense minister and as the commander-in-chief of the army, embarrassed by both the Alejandrina Cox incident and a public protest in front of his house by the wives of his generals. General Augusto Pinochet replaced him as Army commander-in-chief the same day.[49]

Supreme Court's resolution

On May 26, 1973, the Supreme Court of Chile unanimously denounced the Allende government's disruption of the legality of the nation in its failure to uphold judicial decisions, because of its continual refusal to permit police execution of judicial decisions contrary to the government's own measures.

Chamber of Deputies' resolution

On August 22, 1973, the Christian Democrats and the National Party members of the Chamber of Deputies joined together to vote 81 to 47 in favor of a resolution that asked the authorities to "put an immediate end" to "breach[es of] the Constitution . . . with the goal of redirecting government activity toward the path of law and ensuring the Constitutional order of our Nation, and the essential underpinnings of democratic co-existence among Chileans."
The resolution declared that Allende's government sought "to conquer absolute power with the obvious purpose of subjecting all citizens to the strictest political and economic control by the State . . . [with] the goal of establishing . . . a totalitarian system" and claimed that the government had made "violations of the Constitution . . . a permanent system of conduct." Essentially, most of the accusations were about disregard by the Socialist government of the separation of powers, and arrogating legislative and judicial prerogatives to the executive branch of government.
Specifically, the Socialist government of President Allende was accused of:
  • Ruling by decree, thwarting the normal legislative system
  • Refusing to enforce judicial decisions against its partisans; not carrying out sentences and judicial resolutions that contravened its objectives
  • Ignoring the decrees of the independent General Comptroller's Office
  • Sundry media offenses; usurping control of the National Television Network and applying economic pressure against those media organizations that are not unconditional supporters of the government
  • Allowing its Socialist supporters to assemble with arms, and preventing the same by its right-wing opponents
  • Supporting more than 1,500 illegal "takings" of farms
  • Illegal repression of the El Teniente miners’ strike
  • Illegally limiting emigration
Finally, the resolution condemned the creation and development of government-protected [socialist] armed groups, which . . . are headed towards a confrontation with the armed forces. President Allende's efforts to re-organize the military and the police forces were characterized as notorious attempts to use the armed and police forces for partisan ends, destroy their institutional hierarchy, and politically infiltrate their ranks.[50]

President Allende's response

Two days later, on 24 August 1973, President Allende responded,[51] characterising the Congress's declaration as destined to damage the country’s prestige abroad and create internal confusion, predicting It will facilitate the seditious intention of certain sectors. He noted that the declaration (passed 81–47 in the Chamber of Deputies) had not obtained the two-thirds Senate majority constitutionally required to convict the president of abuse of power: essentially, the Congress were invoking the intervention of the armed forces and of Order against a democratically-elected government and subordinat[ing] political representation of national sovereignty to the armed institutions, which neither can nor ought to assume either political functions or the representation of the popular will.
Mr Allende argued he had obeyed constitutional means for including military men to the cabinet at the service of civic peace and national security, defending republican institutions against insurrection and terrorism. In contrast, he said that Congress was promoting a coup d’état or a civil war with a declaration full of affirmations that had already been refuted beforehand and which, in substance and process (directly handing it to the ministers rather than directly handing it to the President) violated a dozen articles of the (then-current) Constitution. He further argued that the legislature was usurping the government's executive function.
President Allende wrote: Chilean democracy is a conquest by all of the people. It is neither the work nor the gift of the exploiting classes, and it will be defended by those who, with sacrifices accumulated over generations, have imposed it . . . With a tranquil conscience . . . I sustain that never before has Chile had a more democratic government than that over which I have the honor to preside . . . I solemnly reiterate my decision to develop democracy and a state of law to their ultimate consequences . . . Parliament has made itself a bastion against the transformations . . . and has done everything it can to perturb the functioning of the finances and of the institutions, sterilizing all creative initiatives.
Adding that economic and political means would be needed to relieve the country's current crisis, and that the Congress were obstructing said means; having already paralyzed the State, they sought to destroy it. He concluded by calling upon the workers, all democrats and patriots to join him in defending the Chilean Constitution and the revolutionary process.

The coup

Main article: 1973 Chilean coup d'état
In early September 1973, Allende floated the idea of resolving the constitutional crisis with a plebiscite. His speech outlining such a solution was scheduled for 11 September, but he was never able to deliver it. On 11 September 1973, the Chilean military staged a coup against Allende.

Death

Main article: Death of Salvador Allende
Statue of Allende in front of the Palacio de la Moneda
Just prior to the capture of La Moneda (the Presidential Palace), with gunfire and explosions clearly audible in the background, Allende gave his (subsequently famous) farewell speech to Chileans on live radio, speaking of himself in the past tense, of his love for Chile and of his deep faith in its future. He stated that his commitment to Chile did not allow him to take an easy way out, and he would not be used as a propaganda tool by those he called "traitors" (he refused an offer of safe passage), clearly implying he intended to fight to the end.[52]
"Workers of my country, I have faith in Chile and its destiny. Other men will overcome this dark and bitter moment when treason seeks to prevail. Keep in mind that, much sooner than later, the great avenues will again be opened through which will pass free men to construct a better society. Long live Chile! Long live the people! Long live the workers!"
President Salvador Allende's farewell speech, 11 September 1973.[4]
Shortly afterwards, the coup plotters announced that Allende committed suicide. An official announcement declared that he had committed suicide with an automatic rifle. Prior to his death he had been photographed several times holding an AK-47, a gift from his good friend Fidel Castro.[53] He was found dead with this gun. In his 2004 documentary Salvador Allende, Patricio Guzmán incorporates a graphic image of Allende's corpse in the position it was found after his death. According to Guzmán's documentary, Allende shot himself with a pistol and not a rifle.
For years, Chilean left-wing maintained that Allende had been assassinated, considering that a suicide would weaken Allende's figure. His doctor, José Quiroga, witness of Allende's suicide, but who kept silence for a long time, said “It was more important the political issue of everybody believing that Allende had been killed by the military”.[54] In recent years the view that he committed suicide has become more broadly accepted, particularly as different testimonies appear to confirm details of the suicide reported in news and documentary interviews.[55][56][57][58][59] His personal doctor described the death as a suicide, and his family accepts the finding. The theory that he was assassinated persists and is referenced in the Michael Moore film Bowling for Columbine.[60]
In 2011, the controversy over the cause of death was reopened as the subject of an official investigation. On the basis of the original 1973 autopsy, Luis Ravanal, a medical examiner, expressed the opinion that the wounds on the body were not consistent with the theses of the alleged witnesses, namely that there were wounds caused by different guns.[61] In January 2011, a Chilean judge ordered an inquiry,[62] the first judicial investigation of the death. On May 23, 2011, Allende's body was exhumed in order to have an autopsy performed by an international forensic team.[63] On May 31, TVN, the state television station, reported the recent discovery of a secret 300-page military account of Allende's death. The document had been kept in the home of a former military justice official, and was discovered when his house was destroyed in the 2010 earthquake. After reviewing the report, two forensic experts told TVN "that they are inclined to conclude that Allende was assassinated."[64] This belief is supported by forensic expert Luis Ravanal who has been studying Allende's autopsy since 2007. Ravanal says he found details in the autopsy that weren't in line with the official version of Allende's death. The cranium, he says, shows evidence of a first shot with a small gun, like a pistol, and then, a second shot from a larger weapon — like an AK-47 — which could mean that Allende was shot and killed, then shot a second time with his own gun, to make it look like suicide.[65] Chile's Legal Medical Service confirmed on July 19, 2011 that the death was suicide, consistent with the beliefs of Allende's family.[66] Dr. Patricio Bustos, the director of Chile's LMS, described the conclusions as "definitive". Briton David Prayer, an expert in ballistics, stated that the former president died as the result of two gunshots wounds which came from an assault rifle placed between his legs and aimed at his chin.[67] The scientific autopsy team delivered a unanimous finding that Allende used an AK-47 rifle given to him by Fidel Castro. The gun was set to fire automatically and the shots tore off the top of his head, killing him instantly.[68]

Family

Main article: Allende family
An East German stamp commemorating Allende
Well-known relatives of Salvador Allende include his daughter Isabel Allende (politician) and a cousin Isabel Allende (author).

Memorials

Memorials to Allende include a statue in front of the Palacio de la Moneda.

See also

References

  1. ^ "Profile of Salvador Allende". BBC. 8 September 2003. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3089846.stm. 
  2. ^ Pipes, Richard (2003). Communism: A History. The Modern Library. p. 138. ISBN 0-8129-6864-6. 
  3. ^ "Chile: The Bloody End of a Marxist Dream... Allende's downfall had implications that reached far beyond the borders of Chile. His had been the first democratically elected Marxist government in Latin America...". Time Magazine. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,907929,00.html. 
  4. ^ a b Salvador Allende's Last Speech
  5. ^ post (2011-07-19). "Informe del Servicio Médico Legal confirma la tesis del suicidio de ex Presidente Allende | Política". La Tercera. http://www.latercera.com/noticia/politica/2011/07/674-380613-9-informe-del-servicio-medico-legal-confirma-la-tesis-del-suicidio-de-ex.shtml. Retrieved 2011-09-18. 
  6. ^ [1]
  7. ^ "Biography of Allende". salvador-allende.cl. http://www.salvador-allende.cl/biografia/Trayectoria.pdf. 
  8. ^ a b c d e f g Patricio Guzmán, Salvador Allende (film documentary, 2004)
  9. ^ "?". http://www.genealog.cl/Chile/A/Allende/. [dead link]
  10. ^ Tallentire, Mark (3 August 2010). "A hundred years on, Everton face Everton for the first time". The Guardian (London). http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/blog/2010/aug/03/everton-chile-football/. 
  11. ^ "Unmasked defamatory libel on Salvador Allende". 27 May 2005. http://www.elclarin.cl/fpa/temas/20.html.  with link to thesis, on the Clarin's website (English) (Spanish version available)
  12. ^ Salvador Allende by Hedda Garza
  13. ^ "Telegram protesting against the persecution of Jews in Germany". El Clarín de Chile's. http://www.elclarin.cl/fpa/pdf/p_020605.pdf.  (Spanish)
  14. ^ Mark Falcoff (10 November 2003). "Kissinger and Chile originally". frontpagemag.com. http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=10612. Retrieved 21 September 2006. 
  15. ^ Régis Debray (1972). The Chilean Revolution: Conversations with Allende. New York: Vintage Books. 
  16. ^ "Como Allende destruyo la democracia en Chile". elcato.org. http://www.elcato.org/node/2108.  (Spanish)
  17. ^ (Spanish) "La Unidad Popular". icarito.latercera.cl. Archived from the original on 7 March 2005. http://web.archive.org/web/20050307181050/http://icarito.latercera.cl/icarito/2003/912/pag1a.htm. , archived 7 March 2005 on the Internet Archive
  18. ^ Collier & Sater, 1996.
  19. ^ Faundez, 1988.
  20. ^ The Macroeconomics of populism in Latin America by Rüdiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards
  21. ^ The Cambridge History of Latin America Volume VIII edited by Leslie Bethell
  22. ^ a b c A History of Chile, 1808–1994, by Simon Collier and William F. Sater
  23. ^ a b (Spanish) "Comienzan los problemas". Enciclopedia Escolar Icarito. Archived from the original on 22 September 2003. http://web.archive.org/web/20030922064807/http://icarito.latercera.cl/icarito/2003/912/pag1b.htm. . Archived on the Internet Archive, 22 September 2003
  24. ^ a b United States Senate Report (1975) "Covert Action in Chile, 1963–1973" U.S. Government Printing Office Washington. D.C.
  25. ^ (Spanish) "Declaración de la Asamblea Plenaria del Episcopado sobre la Escuela Nacional Unificada". Conferencia Episcopal de Chile. 11 April 1973. 
  26. ^ Eden Medina, "Designing Freedom, Regulating a Nation: Socialist Cybernetics in Allende's Chile," Journal of Latin American Studies 38 (2006):571–606.
  27. ^ Edy Kaufman, "Crisis in Allende's Chile: New Perspectives", Praeger Publishers, New York, 1988. 266–267.
  28. ^ Richard Gott.Latin America is preparing to settle accounts with its white settler elite. Guardian Unlimited, 15 November 2006. Retrieved on 22 December 2006.
  29. ^ Figures are from November, 1986, pp. 4–12, tables 1.1 & 1.7
  30. ^ Hoogvelt, 1997
  31. ^ Nove, 1986
  32. ^ Tier, Mark, 1973, "Allende Erred", Nation Review (Melbourne, Australia), 12–18 October
  33. ^ Still Hidden: A Full Record Of What the U.S. Did in Chile, Peter Kornbluh, The Washington Post, Sunday 24 October 1999; Page B01
  34. ^ The USSR and Latin America By Eusebio Mujal-León
  35. ^ "Pawn or Player? Chile in the cold war". http://www.cepchile.cl/dms/archivo_1150_299/rev72_fermandois_ing.pdf. 
  36. ^ a b Hinchey Report CIA Activities in Chile. 18 September 2000. Accessed online 18 November 2006.
  37. ^ CIA Reveals Covert Acts In Chile, Admits Support For Kidnappers, Links To Pinochet Regime – CBS News
  38. ^ "Church Report. Covert Action in Chile 1963–1973", 18 December 1975.
  39. ^ CIA Reveals Covert Acts In Chile, CBS News, 19 September 2000.
  40. ^ Jonathan Franklin, Files show Chilean blood on US hands, The Guardian, 11 October 1999.
  41. ^ a b Moran, Theodore (1974). Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence: CoppeEncyclopedic r in Chile. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
  42. ^ Brandt, Daniel (1998-11-28). "U.S. Responsibility for the Coup in Chile". NameBase. Archived from the original on 2012-01-16. http://www.webcitation.org/64k6he2wX. Retrieved 2012-01-20. 
  43. ^ "The Kissinger Telcons: Kissinger Telcons on Chile, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 123, edited by Peter Kornbluh, posted May 26, 2004". http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB123/chile.htm.  This particular dialogue can be found at "Telcon: September 16, 1973, 11:50 am Kissinger Talking to Nixon". http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB123/Box%2022,%20File%203,%20Telcon,%209-16-73%2011,50%20Mr.%20Kissinger-The%20Pres%202.pdf. Retrieved 26 November 2006.. 
  44. ^ a b Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin How 'weak' Allende was left out in the cold by the KGB (excerpt from The Mitrokhin Archive Volume II), The Times (UK), 19 September 2005.
  45. ^ a b c The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World by Christopher Andrew, 736 pages, 2005.
  46. ^ a b c d "Soviet intelligence in Latin America during the Cold War – Lectures by General Nikolai Leonov". Centro de Estudios Publicos (Chile). 22 September 1999.. http://www.cepchile.cl/dms/lang_2/doc_1140.html. 
  47. ^ Second coup attempt: El Tanquetazo (the tank attack), originally on RebelYouth.ca. Unsigned, but with citations. Archived on Internet Archive 13 October 2004.
  48. ^ Historia de Chile. Accessed online 15 May 2009.
  49. ^ a b (Spanish) Se desata la crisis, part of series "Icarito > Enciclopedia Virtual > Historia > Historia de Chile > Del gobierno militar a la democracia" on LaTercera.cl. Accessed 22 September 2006.
  50. ^ English translation on Wikisource.
  51. ^ (Spanish) respuesta del Presidente Allende on Wikisource. (English) English translation on Wikisource, accessed 22 September 2006.
  52. ^ "Socialist Says AllendeOnce Spoke of Suicide". The New York Times. 12 September 1973. http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F60E14FC3B54137A93C0A81782D85F478785F9. Retrieved 10 April 2010. 
  53. ^ A Victim of the U.S. Cold War Rises from the Grave
  54. ^ Labarca, Eduardo (2007). Salvador Allende : biografía sentimental (1a. ed. ed.). Santiago de Chile: Catalonia. p. 401. ISBN 978-956-8303-68-6. 
  55. ^ "The World: Allende's Last Day". Time. 4 February 1974. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,908433,00.html. Retrieved 10 April 2010. 
  56. ^ Christian, Shirley (17 September 1990). "Leftist Journal Concludes Allende Killed Himself". The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/1990/09/17/world/leftist-journal-concludes-allende-killed-himself.html. Retrieved 10 April 2010. 
  57. ^ "Wife admits Allende suicide with gun Castro gave him". Chicago Tribune. 16 September 1973. http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/chicagotribune/access/605672702.html?dids=605672702:605672702&FMT=CITE&FMTS=CITE:AI&date=Sep+16%2C+1973&author=&pub=Chicago+Tribune&desc=Wife+admits+Allende+suicide+with+gun+Castro+gave+him&pqatl=google. 
  58. ^ Parkinson, William (16 September 1973). "The death of Allende: Officially a suicide". Chicago Tribune. http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/chicagotribune/access/605674032.html?dids=605674032:605674032&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:AI&date=Sep+16%2C+1973&author=William+Parkinson&pub=Chicago+Tribune&desc=The+death+of+Allende%3A+Officially+a+suicide&pqatl=google. 
  59. ^ Camus, Ignacio Gonzalez, El dia en que murio Allende ("The day that Allende Died"). Instituto Chileno de Estudios Humanísticos (ICHEH) and Centro de Estudios Sociales (CESOC), 1988. p. 282 and following.
  60. ^ "Profile: Salvador Allende". BBC News. 8 September 2009. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3089846.stm. Retrieved 15 May 2009. 
  61. ^ France-Presse, Agence (2011-04-15). "Chile Orders Exhumation to Settle How President Allende Died". The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/16/world/americas/16chile.html. Retrieved 2011-05-18. 
  62. ^ Bonnefoy, Pascale (27 January 2011). "Chilean Judge Orders Investigation Into Allende’s Death". The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/28/world/americas/28chile.html. Retrieved 2011-01-28. 
  63. ^ Vergara, Eva (2011-05-23). "Allende's body taken from Chile tomb for autopsy". heraldonline. http://www.heraldonline.com/2011/05/23/3089889/allendes-body-taken-from-chile.html. Retrieved 2011-05-24. 
  64. ^ "Chile TV: Secret military report on Allende’s death raises doubts about suicide". Washington Post. 31 May 2011. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/chile-tv-secret-military-report-on-allendes-death-raises-doubts-about-suicide/2011/05/31/AG1rkTFH_story.html. Retrieved 2011-05-31. [dead link]
  65. ^ "For Chileans, Allende's Exhumation Raises The Past". National Public Radio. 31 May 2011. http://www.npr.org/2011/05/31/136831116/chile-investigates-ex-presidents-cause-of-death. Retrieved 2011-05-31. 
  66. ^ "Former Chilean President Allende's death confirmed as suicide". CNN. 19 July 2011. http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/americas/07/19/chile.allende/index.html?hpt=hp_p1&iref=NS1. 
  67. ^ Scotsman Newspaper website 20 July 2011
  68. ^ Chilean president Salvador Allende committed suicide, autopsy confirms The Guardian, 2011-07-20.

Other sources

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Political offices
Preceded by
Miguel Etchebarne		Minister of Public Health,
Social Assistance and Welfare
1939–1942		Succeeded by
Eduardo Escudero
Preceded by
Tomás Reyes		President of the Senate of Chile
1966–1969		Succeeded by
Tomás Pablo
Preceded by
Eduardo Frei Montalva		President of Chile
1970–1973		Succeeded by
Augusto Pinochet

 
 
1908 births
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